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No Measure for Culture? Value in the New Economy 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the articulation of the value of investment in culture and the arts through a 
critical discourse analysis of policy documents, reports and commentary since 1997. It argues that 
in this period discourses around the value of culture have moved from the direct economic 
contributions of the culture industries to indirect economic benefits. These indirect benefits are 
discussed under three main headings: creativity and innovation, employability and social inclusion. 
These in turn are analysed in terms of three forms of capital: human, social and cultural. The paper 
concludes with an analysis of this discursive shift through the lens of autonomist Marxist concerns 
with the labour of social reproduction. It is our argument that, in contemporary policy discourses on 
culture and the arts, that government in the UK is increasingly concerned with the use of culture to 
form the social in the image of capital. As such we have to turn our attention beyond the walls of 
the factory in order to understand the contemporary capitalist production of value.  
Introduction 
Due to their use of semi- or non-industrial modes of symbol production, the visual arts have a 
formally marginal or 'peripheral' position within the creative, or cultural, industries (Hesmondalgh, 
2006: 13). Nevertheless, when it comes to autonomy, the arts, and artists, are often granted a 
privileged position within those industries as an exemplar of unalienated work (Shorthose and 
Strange, 2004; Wittel, 2004). In part this exemplarity is doubtless due to the apparent 
irreconcilability of high-culture and the economy. As Bourdieu (1993) characterised it, the field of 
cultural production is „the economic world reversed‟ in that economic success is often a sign of 
artistic failure for artists and writers. If an artist reaches a mass audience, or enters into 
standardised, industrialised production, then their status as 'artist' becomes questionable. Rather, 
artists offer an example of apparently 'unalienated' work by seemingly remaining autonomous and 
free from both the pressures of the market and from the hierarchical industrialization of their labour 
process (Wittel, 2004). In idealised artistic production, product and process, form and content, are 
independently determined within autonomous 'communities' of cultural production (Shorthose and 
Strange, 2004). The artistic community determines what counts as 'good' art and the individual artist 
determines both the aesthetic projects they undertake and the conduct of their own labour process.  
 
This apparent autonomy means that the visual artist has become something like a litmus test for 
autonomy within the creative industries and can be held up as a measure for other creative 
processes seeking to escape the logics of industrial-capitalist organization. In commentary on 
peer-to-peer and open-source software production, for example, there is an emphasis on the way in 
which those involved in coding are recognised by their virtuosity and skill in crafting 'good' code 
(Raymond, 2001; Sennett, 2008). The standard for what is 'good' code is not determined by an 
external market or line-manager, as would be the case in a commercial software company, but 
rather by peer evaluation that can reflect factors and judgements quite specific to the actors 
involved in production, for example, the ingenuity or quality of 'the hack' (Jordan and Taylor, 
2004). As with artists, the value of such work is autonomously determined by informal peer 
evaluation and pays off in terms of an economy of cultural prestige rather than conventional, 
monetary economic terms (Rehn, ****). Whether this form of production is compared to a 
pre-industrial economy of guild-based craftsmanship (Sennett, 2008) or a post-modern, 
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community-based digital gift economy (Rehn, ****; cf Teranova, 2004) the focus on autonomy and 
independence from industrial capitalist systems of organization and evaluation are central to such 
analyses and reflect assumptions about cultural production that are deeply ingrained in suppositions 
about artistic production and creativity. As Shorthose and Strange (2004: 47) put it, "Artistic labour 
is inherently linked to autonomy and self-determination, if it is to be a real and genuine expression 
of creative labour power." 
 
Within these 'creative communities', or 'creative ecologies' (Shorthose and Strange, 2004) 
productive activity is conducted according to autonomously determined social values, decided 
through the on-going and repeated, social interactions of the community members. This renders 
such relations distinct from both the formal, hierarchical relationships of the employment 
relationship, and the impersonal, fetishism of the market. Removed from both of capitalism's main 
structures for evaluating and controlling labour, the work of the artist lies 'beyond value', as Hardt 
and Negri (2000; Negri, 1999) would put it.  
... the value of artistic labour is difficult to quantify or measure because of its collective, intangible 
nature and its independence from formal market exchange, where prices provide an index (however 
misleading and distorted) of social value. However, clearly the artistic and cultural labour of the 
creative ecology makes a substantial contribution to the general welfare of society and its 
communities. (Shorthose and Strange, 2004: 49) 
 
It is this apparent autonomy and immeasurability of artistic production that we take issue with in 
this paper. Rather than rehearsing the various conceptual debates there have been over 
immeasurability and affective, or immaterial, labour (see Harvie, 2006 for a recent summary of, and 
contribution to, this debate) we examine some of the discursive strategies that arts organizations and 
the government have developed in addressing the difficulty of measuring the value of the arts. 
Working with the results of a critical discourse analysis of governmental policy documents, 
academic and think-tank publications, consultancy reports and industry analyses, we suggest that, 
far from supporting a strategy of autonomous production, the state, in the UK at least, has been 
active in seeking to overcome the difficulty of measuring artistic labour by developing new metrics 
and understandings of cultural and artistic value. The study focuses primarily upon the second of 
these, examining how 'cultural' and 'artistic' value has been articulated in these documents rather 
than looking in detail at how these conceptions of cultural value have been operationalised in 
particular technologies of evaluation. Our findings suggest that, since 1997 at least, there has been a 
clear tendency, in line with the 'new public management' (ref. ****) to move away from the more 
marketised systems of control and evaluation followed by the Conservative government in the 1980 
and early 1990s, toward more bureaucratic forms of management and evaluation in the arts. This 
rearticulation has shifted the 'value' of the arts away from directly economic factors, such as 
profitability or even less direct economic benefits like tourism and job creation in supportive 
service industries, toward more issues such as education and training, social inclusion, and 
community cohesion. As we suggest, rather than considering these as resulting from confusion over 
the boundaries between the social and the economic, the fact that government increasingly 
articulates the 'return on investement' in the arts in such social terms suggests a deepening of, and 
enrolment of the arts in, what Negri refers to as the 'real subsumption' of the social under capital. 
Often this is such a direct attempt at subsumption that these benefits are referred to in terms of 
'human capital' and 'social' or 'cultural' capital. The first of these comprises both formal and 
informal education and training that result in the generation of transferable skills like creativity and 
enterprise. The latter concepts are mobilised in often quite imprecise ways but we use them here to 
refer to the ways in which the documents examined suggest that the arts can increase social 
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engagement by both facilitating the generation of productive networks and encouraging a culture of 
'aspiration' that, through an engagement with the arts, will raise individuals abilities to engage 
productively with capitalist society.  
 
Evolving Discourses of Evaluation and Measurement in the Arts 
A broad picture has been painted in the policy studies literature (e.g. Matarasso, 1997; Mizra, 2006) 
in which, during the 1980s under a Conservative government, the arts in the UK were seen as a 
business like any other, and subject to the rule of the market and supply/demand economics. In this 
period many galleries and museums had to fight hard for a share of the limited subsidies available. 
Within the Thatcher government‟s neo-liberal emphasis on efficiency through markets, where 
organisations competed for limited resources in a Darwinian fight for survival, the idea of 
„subsidy‟, like „unemployment benefits‟ and other forms of social welfare, were seen as both an 
unnecessary tax burden hampering the growth of the national economy, and an unjustified 
intervention in the market that would support parasitic and weak organisations. Through the 1980s 
and early 1990s subsidies to the arts were cut and theatres, galleries and museums were supposed to 
compete alongside other forms of entertainment for customers‟ attention and money. In such a 
climate, subsidised culture had to justify itself on relatively narrow economics grounds, for 
example: increased tourism, urban regeneration and benefit to local business (Holden, 2004: 15). 
Where subsidies were not available, organisations were forced to compete for the public‟s money 
with more popular cultural and entertainment activities, pushing admissions costs up and 
reinforcing the notion that the arts were only for a small elite. Nevertheless, within the constraints 
of reduced funding and the imperatives of the market, the management of the arts was pretty much 
left alone. The principle of self-determination, and the ability of those in the arts to decide what to 
spend their resources on, and how to account for this expenditure, was similar to the freedom that 
any other manager or entrepreneur might expect in this time of hands-off government. 
 
With the change of government to New Labour in 1997, this discourse also changed. Culture was a 
centrepiece of Blair‟s vision for Britain, captured in the media friendly idea of a „Cool Britannia‟. 
Whilst much of this discourse focussed on the music industry and popular culture, there was also a 
place in this policy orientation for the arts and what had traditionally been seen as „high-culture‟. 
Galleries and museums were to have their admissions costs removed to democratise access and the 
total spend on culture increased by 73% in real terms over the next 10 years (DCMS, 2007: 5). This 
was not, however, framed as an increase in „subsidy‟, but as an increase in „investment‟ (Gray, 
2002: 84). Of course, as with any investment, there has to be a pay-back. This was not, however, 
necessarily supposed to be in the form of direct financial returns. Metrics were devised, and 
promises made, that investment in the arts would pay off in other ways, for example through 
indirect economic benefits and by delivering on other areas of policy concern, such as social 
inclusion, crime and health. The kind of indirect economic benefits promised, and sometimes 
reported, included increased tourism, local regeneration and the development of cultural quarters to 
attract the „creative class‟ that have been constructed as the key value producer in the new economy 
(Matarasso, 1997; Florida, 2002).  
 
As well as direct and indirect economic impacts of investment in culture and the arts, the last ten 
years have seen a range of other social and policy relevant benefits being promised. Participation in 
the arts has been claimed to benefit individuals and communities by improving health, reducing 
crime, increasing social inclusion and community cohesion, and generally contributing to a sense of 
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„well-being‟. Although not strictly financial benefits, these social benefits are economic in the 
broader sense of contributing to the economic health of the region and nation (Matarasso, 1997). It 
is to a discussion of these that the next section turns, as we present a discourse analysis of 
government policy documents and publications by funding bodies, think-tanks, consultants and 
academics. 
 
The Social Impacts of Culture and the Arts: A Critical Discourse Analysis 
Creativity and Innovation 
Much of the discourse on the „social impacts‟ or „value‟ of the arts is suffused with the ideas that, in 
the UK at least, we are living in a knowledge economy, or a creative economy. This framework is 
often so implicit in policy, think-tank and consultancy writings on investment in culture and the arts 
that it is not even articulated explicitly. Rather, words like „creativity‟ and „innovation‟ are scattered 
throughout the documents without necessarily pointing to any specific economic benefits. The 
assumption seems to be that „creativity‟ is a good thing in itself and is a transferable skill with the 
implication that developing the population‟s artistic creativity will deliver creativity and innovation 
in other sectors. In some documents, however, the link is explicit. On the first page of „Values and 
Visions: The Contribution of Culture‟, a document jointly produced by a consortium of 
organisations involved in funding and administering culture, the bold claim is made that: 
In the future, Britain‟s economic prosperity and well-being will not depend on industrial prowess, natural 
resources or cheap labour but on developing, attracting, retaining and mobilising creativity. In this 21st century, 
goods, services and industries driven by knowledge and creativity will define Britain‟s competitive edge. This 
can only happen if its economic strategy is fed by social changes that make culture and creativity part of 
everyone‟s life. (ACE et al, 2006: 1) 
In the same document, the organisations signing up to it advocate „promoting a society that values 
knowledge‟ and „encouraging creativity and innovation‟ (ACE et al, 2006: 3).  
 
For the organisations involved in producing „Values and Vision‟, this focus on innovation and 
creativity cuts two ways. On the one hand, culture and the arts can deliver value by contributing to 
the creativity of Britain‟s workforce. On the other hand, they themselves need to innovate if they 
are to effectively deliver on this promise. The final page of the document gently reminds any 
politicians of the importance for increased funding of culture and the arts, by proclaiming the need 
to 
invest in the future by encouraging innovation and experiment, by using new technologies to devise new ways of 
presenting and enjoying culture, and by ensuring that every member of society has equal access to all that we 
have to offer, and actively takes part in everything we do. (ACE et al, 2006: 12) 
These two quotes, from the beginning and end of this document, demonstrate well the current 
situation of the arts. Despite increased funding under New Labour, culture still has to demonstrate 
its significance to wider policy concerns, in this instance through the economic-value producing 
functions of creativity and innovation. Also, although funding has increased, it has not always kept 
up with increasing demands placed upon museums and galleries. In a House of Commons Report 
from 2002, for example, it was noted that „There has been a long term decline in the value of public 
funding‟ (HoC, 2002: 15) that had actually been exacerbated by the introduction of free admissions. 
Since the removal of admissions fees, more people were visiting museums and galleries, extending 
the social benefits attributed to cultural engagement, but only at the cost of a „concomitant increase 
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in wear and tear on the fabric of the institutions and increased demands on staff for front-of-house 
services and security‟ that was not being recognised by compensatory funding increases (HoC, 
2002: 15).  
 
As well as a plea for additional funding, this discourse introduces an additional layer of meaning to 
innovation and creativity in the arts. To deliver on policy promises and have social impacts beyond 
the small elite traditionally associated with high-culture, the arts must reach a wider population. It 
will only be able to do this if it is able, as a sector, to innovate its organisational structures and 
methods of cultural delivery (cf. Harris, 2006). 
 
These twin concerns coalesce in some of the reports we studied around the idea of new media and 
information and communication technologies (ICT). For example, in a newsletter from 
firstsite:newsite, a visual arts gallery that is still under construction in Essex, it was reported that 
„advances in technology and new media tools provide opportunities to expand way of engaging 
with art both in and out of the building‟ (firstsite, 2007: 5). In a similar vein, though playing more 
heavily on the economic benefits of organisational and technical innovation in the arts, Matarasso 
notes that many of the projects his report reviewed 
used non-hierarchical and co-operative structures to promote a creative work environment. This was especially 
evident among the digital technology projects where, although there was often a central figure, there was also a 
high level of delegation and autonomy, with minimal reporting required… Structures were fluid, with people 
taking on roles according to need, and moving easily between employment, contract work and volunteering. As a 
result, the projects were adaptable, and willing to give people their head, allowing them to follow and idea in the 
knowledge that it might fail. The results are not only a series of innovative projects like person-centred profiling, 
or Internet radio, but new organisational models which allow creativity to thrive. (Matarasso, 1997: 59) 
In combination with his other reports on how innovative, ICT-based arts projects helped disengaged 
young people into work, for example in Harlem and London (1997: 21) as well as in Helsinki 
(1997: 23; Kelly et al, 1997), Matarasso links together creativity, socio-technical innovation and 
risk-taking with learning new, highly marketable, technology-based skills.  
 
Although the education and training aspects of these last examples spills over into our second 
category (below), it is worth noting here the links between organisational form and innovation. For 
Matarasso, one of the sources of innovation in the arts is that participation is often not heavily 
formalised, but takes places within a shifting and flexible, constellation of participants, volunteers, 
contractors and employees. In this he (e.g., 1997: 59-62) reflects post-Fordist discourses of 
flexibility and entrepreneurial risk-taking with their emphasis on empowerment, critiques of 
hierarchy and bureaucracy, and use of the network metaphor, ideas that are also commonplace in 
writings on knowledge work (e.g., Newell et al, 2002). In so doing, his study of the social impact of 
the arts contains a series of normative assumptions that dominated the popular managerial, as well 
as economic, discourses of the 1990s, most notably the idea of precarious and insecure employment 
situations being empowering and liberating workers from stifling bureaucracy that killed creativity 
(cf. Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005).  
 
Education, Training, Skills and Employability 
As already mentioned in relation to innovation and creativity, several of the documents we studied 
make links between participation in the arts, the development of transferable skills, and 
employability. This is particularly prominent in relation to projects using new media. For example, 
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Matarasso reports on the success of Finnish projects working with young people using digital 
technologies where the skills learned on the projects could be directly utilised in employment: 
The digital technology projects were often important routes to employment, enabling and encouraging the 
acquisition of high level and relatively rare skills. As a result, many of those involved – who also tended to be 
young, and not to have previous success in education or employment – found themselves in possession of highly 
marketable skills… trainees had found employment in areas ranging from word processing to graphic design and 
desktop publishing; in the last year, five teenagers had left the project to take up programming. (Matarasso, 
1997: 23) 
Matarasso also points to the use of participative arts projects in schools, noting that their value goes 
beyond that of the arts as a subject area: „Whatever value the arts have in their own right in the 
curriculum (and they have much), their potential for supporting broad educational goals should be 
recognised‟ (Matarasso, 1997: 19). For example, he found that participation in the arts could have a 
positive impact on the development of language skills, physical coordination, observation skills, 
social skills and, most notably, creativity and imagination, linking back to the previous category.  
 
Although there is much reference to broad, life-long learning and skills development in the 
documents, there is also a strong focus on the importance of art galleries and museums for formal 
education. The House of Commons report on free admissions from 2002 even goes so far as to 
suggest that the arts should be cross-subsidised from education budgets (HoC, 2002: 7). In their 
newsletter, firstsite, the Essex-based arts organisation, suggest that „One in 10 children from the 
north Essex area has taken part in our educational activities‟ (firstsite, 2007: 5) and include a 
number of pictures of children engaged in art projects in their schools and at the „newsite‟ site 
(2007: 5; 2). In „Values and Vision‟ the Arts Council of England and its collaborators make much 
of the use of museums by school children and make explicit the contribution to knowledge and 
learning that arts and cultural institutions make: 
83% of visitors say that the museum or gallery visited was an exciting place to visit, with 80% also saying that 
they had gained new knowledge and understanding as a result of their visit. (ACE et al, 2006: 11) 
This conjunction of education and fun was not unusual. The House of Commons report in particular 
was at great pains to point out that, although museums in particular were of great scientific and 
educational importance, „Perhaps most importantly these institutions are also fun and fascinating 
places to visit‟ (HoC, 2002: 9). By combining fun and learning, these reports fit well with 
contemporary discourses on the value of life-long learning and the need for education, like work, to 
be both enjoyable and to extend beyond the classroom or workplace (Edwards, 1997). Of central 
importance here seems to be engaging students who may otherwise be failed in the classroom. As 
Matarasso notes: 
Teachers were often surprised at the level of concentration and effort their pupils were prepared to give to art 
activities and at the engagement of unexpected children. They spoke at length about the new self-confidence 
which some of the quieter members of the class had acquired as a result of shining in the art sessions. (1997: 20) 
Matarasso continues to suggest that the arts can be a way of engaging children in education outside 
the classroom, catering for otherwise neglected groups with specific educational needs, such as 
disabled children (1997: 20) and adults, for whom participation in the arts could provide a route into 
more formalised learning, for example through full-time further education or and open-university 
degree (1997: 21). 
 
A local government association (LGA) report into value in the arts in Essex referred to education 
and training in terms of „human capital‟: „skills and experiences gained by the individual but 
sustained beyond the life of the arts experience‟ (LGA, 2003: 39). The survey suggested that 
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participants „reported a positive contribution to their confidence, modes of thinking and personal 
well-being‟ (2003: 40) following the activities. Often this increased confidence led to a more 
conventional development of individual human capital, as 75% of participants reported that they 
had „decided to start some further training or a college course‟ (2003: 41). Thus, human capital 
focuses on issues of employability, learning, transferable skills and training. Often this is formalised 
through education, though not necessarily so. Whilst some reports focus on the educational 
resources provided by arts programmes and cultural activities for schools, particularly when housed 
in dedicated venues, other discussions of human capital are more diffuse and suggest that any 
exposure to the arts can increase human capital.  
 
In combination, these first two categories suggest that the arts generate positive social impacts by 
indirectly contributing to the economy. Through training, education, developing creativity and 
creating a space for experimentation and risk-taking, the arts contribute to the development of forms 
of human capital that can subsequently be deployed in the workplace, or through less formalised 
economic activities as part of a shifting, post-Fordist, flexible, networked form of organisation that 
includes volunteers and unpaid labour (Terranova, 2000; Ross, 2000; Arvidsson, 2007). The 
emphasis on otherwise marginalised groups, however, brings us on to our third category of analysis. 
 
Social Inclusion and Community Cohesion 
Social inclusion is a significant theme in the literature on the social impacts of the arts and is often 
approached through the concept of community cohesion. The main argument is that the arts can 
facilitate social inclusion by bringing in the disengaged, socially excluded, or marginalised: those 
who, for whatever reason, find themselves outside of mainstream society.  
 
In our analysis this is developed in two directions. On the one hand, there is an, often implicit, 
critique of multi-culturalism, and, on the other, there is a more class-based critique. In the first 
strand the ideas of national culture and national heritage are invoked and the arts are seen as a way 
of ensuring a coherent national identity. In more extreme cases this draws a comparison with 
totalitarianism. As Eleonora Belfiore has commented: 
The idea that the arts can help shape people‟s beliefs and sense of identity – which is central to contemporary 
debates about the impacts of the arts – has had a central place throughout history in developing the arts and 
culture for propaganda and indoctrination purposes in non-democratic and totalitarian political systems. (2007: 
8) 
Belfiore is, of course, quite intentionally drawing parallels to extreme political situations to show 
that the social impacts of the arts are not always positive. Nevertheless, her point is valid and it has 
long been recognised in cultural studies that culture plays a central role in the production and 
regulation of collective identities such as nationality (Anderson, 1991; Eagleton, 2000) and in 
legitimating colonial rule (Said, 1993).  
 
In the current discourses there is a strong undercurrent that feeds upon similar sentiments, 
celebrating the superiority of British culture and assuming the need for a strong, national culture to 
create social cohesion. On the first page of „Values and vision‟, British culture is unequivocally 
celebrated as a national asset: 
Our mission is to ensure that Britain‟s culture, already internationally celebrated for its creativity and style, 
remains a world leader. (ACE et al, 2006: 1) 
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In the next paragraph, the document implicitly calls for a unified culture, albeit dressed in the 
language of liberal humanist, democratic participation: 
We have made great strides toward ensuring that no one is excluded from the benefits of the public investment 
we represent, but this is only the beginning. By engaging with communities on their own terms, we are now 
moving from a world where we try to guarantee access to cultural events, places and services to one where 
participation by the whole community is the norm. Cultural institutions provide the glue that binds communities 
together… Arts, drama and music help us to explore our emotions and to understand what makes us human. 
Communities cannot thrive without these cultural experiences that help us to gain a deeper sense of our selves 
and our shared heritage. Society cannot restore respect or a sense of worth to communities with police and 
anti-social behaviour orders alone. Without cultural services and cultural experiences communities die. (ACE et 
al, 2006: 1-2) 
There are strong tensions at play in this extract. The suggestion that communities must be engaged 
on their „own terms‟ acknowledges difference, but only within limits laid down by a universal 
humanism where everyone is presumed to share the fundamental identity of „human‟, to which a 
universal „culture‟ presumably speaks. Cultural development, this discourse suggests, must be 
managed within an overarching framework of social integration and regulation. To be excluded is to 
be failed by society, but also to need saving and bringing back into the fold. Clearly the terms for 
what the dominant culture is are determined by the cultural institutions that set themselves up as the 
custodians of „our‟ collective memory and imagination. In the „values and vision‟ document, this 
tension appears particularly starkly as the language moves between „nation‟ and „national‟ – for 
example when discussing the role of the arts in celebrating national identity in the run up to the 
London Olympics – and „community‟, suggesting a more localised, and perhaps subaltern, identity.  
 
This implicit critique of multi-culturalism sits alongside a second sense of „social exclusion‟ that 
refers more to matters of poverty, class and youth. In this strand the discourses find the causes of 
poverty, deviance and crime in social, or rather cultural, marginalisation. Matarasso, focussing on 
youth crimes like vandalism, suggests that crime, and the fear of crime, can be reduced by 
participative arts projects that bring together the generations and strengthen community ties (1997: 
34). Perhaps the starkest example of this version of the social inclusion argument is presented by 
Jowell (2004: 3), however, who claims that Beveridge‟s goal of ending „physical poverty‟ has been 
thwarted because it failed to address „the poverty of aspiration which compromises all our attempts 
to lift people out of physical poverty‟. For Jowell, the social function of culture is precisely to 
„alleviate this poverty of aspiration‟ (2004: 3).  
 
Jowell‟s essay is a complicated and contradictory document. In places she appears to be arguing 
against the instrumentalisation of the arts and advocating more of an „arts-for-art‟s sake‟ argument 
(Jowell, 2004: 8; cf. Belfiore, 2006: 34). This argument for an autonomous, „bottom-up‟ (Jowell, 
2004: 9) development of culture is, however, consistently undercut by her concerns with alleviating 
the „poverty of aspiration‟ she has identified at the heart of physical poverty and social exclusion. 
Thus, in places she discusses the need to offer „improved access to culture for what it does in 
itself… to understand it and speak up for it on its own terms‟ (2004: 8), her conception of what 
culture „does in itself‟ is subsumed under a more general idea of personal development and 
self-actualization, where the consumption of culture enables everyone to realise their potential and 
engage more fully with society: 
Culture alone can give people the means better to understand and engage with life, and as such is a key part in 
reducing the inequality of opportunity and which can help us slay the… poverty of aspiration. This must be the 
next priority in the mission at the core of this Government: to transform our society into a place of justice, talent 
and ambition where individuals can fulfil their true potential. (Jowell, 2004: 17-18) 
Of course, all of this assumes two things. First, that everyone‟s ambition will, once realised through 
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cultural engagement, be identical and can be fulfilled within the confines of contemporary society. 
Without this assumption, social exclusion cannot be remedied by culture. Indeed, if engagement 
with political art might lead people to reject parliamentary democracy and capitalism tout-court, 
then social disengagement could potentially increase as a result of cultural participation. Rather, for 
Jowell, culture fulfils an inherently conservative and socially-integrating function, socialising 
deviant individuals back into mainstream (or at least government sanctioned) society and aligning 
their individual aspirations and desires with that of „the nation‟ as a whole, or at least its 
self-proclaimed spokespeople. In this model, culture appears as a tool of government for controlling 
the population and ensuring that their interests are allied with the dominant socio-economic 
formation. Of course, such a strategy is unlikely to work and in practice the field of cultural 
production is striated with lines of antagonism and can be highly political in both its form and 
content (Bourdieu, 1993; Benjamin, 2002). For the purposes of further exploring the relations 
between culture and the economy, however, it is worth noting how issues such as „personal 
development‟ and „aspiration‟ are coded in relation to capital within these discourses on investment 
in the arts. 
 
The second assumption made by the argument that culture can reduce social exclusion is that the 
problem is, at root, a question of individual attitude, perception and „aspiration‟, rather than more 
systemic or structural factors. From a policy perspective this leads to politicians abrogating 
responsibility for addressing social justice directly. Indeed, it would seem that New Labour has 
taken on board the Thatcherite idea that there is „no such thing as society‟ and opted instead to 
focus on the community as the most appropriate level for governmental intervention (cf. Rose, 
1996). This neglect of „society‟ figures prominently in the literature on the social impact of the arts. 
As Paolo Merli puts it, referring to Matarasso‟s suggestions that the arts can resolve social 
exclusion: 
Many intellectuals have started looking at society as a mere fact: they do not venture questions, hard criticism 
and struggle any more; they increasingly behave like “new missionaries”, who play guitar with marginalised 
youth, the disabled and the unemployed, aiming at mitigating the perception which they have of their own 
exclusion. Indeed, it does not seem that “feeling differently” (Matarasso, 1997, p.101) about the place where one 
lives will transform slums into wonderful places, nor that… having “a positive impact on how people feel” 
(Matarasso, 1997, p.x) will change people‟s daily conditions of existence – it will only “help” people to accept 
them. However, making deprivation more acceptable is a tool to endlessly reproduce it. (Merli, 2002: 112-113) 
As Merli notes here, these models of remedying social exclusion without changing the material 
conditions of exclusion are profoundly conservative. With very few exceptions, and then in 
academic publications, such issues of profound social change are completely ignored within the 
discourses on the social impacts of the arts. Instead, the combination of „social exclusion‟ and 
„community‟ pushes the responsibility for marginalisation back onto the marginalised, assuming 
that they simply need their attitude, rather than their material conditions, readjusting – perhaps 
through the judicious consumption of „culture‟ – simultaneously concealing and maintaining the 
wider social power relations that produce and reproduce inequality and exclusion in the first place.  
 
Human, Social and Cultural Capital 
All three of these categories mobilised in discourses concerned with the evaluation of culture and 
the arts - creativity, employability, and social inclusion - relate to, and are discussed in terms of 
three aspects of capital. The relationship is not one of a clear mapping of one aspect of capital onto 
each category, but there is a general tendency to relate employability with an individualised human 
capital and community cohesion and social integration with social capital. Cultural capital is less 
often used, perhaps because of its association with the more critical writings of Bourdieu and the 
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analysis of class? Even the distinction between human and social capital is not entirely clear, with 
both often referring to skills and employability. As an LGA report defines it, social capital is: „The 
application of skills and experiences by the individual that facilitate co-ordination for mutual 
benefit‟ (2003: 39). Here the big promise is to address social exclusion and create „social capital‟ as 
strong bonds of collective identity, mutual support and networks of cooperation at the local level. 
For example, the LGA report claimed that „81 per cent of participants reported that they have 
become involved in other community projects‟ (2003: 41), referring to this as „active citizenship‟. 
Here, then, the arts are seen as central to the development of social entrepreneurs whose creative 
energies will revitalise both the local culture and economy.  
 
In Jowell‟s (2004: 16) essay, already discussed, she is quite explicit that „culture is an important 
investment in personal social capital‟. Although it is unclear exactly how this „justifies that 
investment on culture‟s own terms‟ (2004: 16) it is fairly clear, in the context of her wider concerns 
with social exclusion and the poverty of aspiration, that her idea of „social capital‟ is predominantly 
concerned with skills and employability. Indeed, these quotes are taken from a paragraph of the 
essay dealing with education. In Jowell‟s framework, then, „investment‟ in culture, both 
governmental and personal (for example, through time spent consuming arts activities), has a pay 
off in terms of „social capital‟. In Jowell‟s sense of the term, perhaps „cultural capital‟ would be a 
more appropriate term, although the heritage that this term carries from Bourdieu‟s (1984) work sits 
ill at ease with Jowell‟s assertions that culture is inherently open and inclusive, taking the form of a 
public good, rather than a commodity (e.g., Jowell, 2004: 5), whose „excellence‟ can be brought to 
the masses without detriment to its inherent value (2004: 10). The concept of „social capital‟, on the 
other hand, particularly in the light of the popularity of the term since Putnam‟s (2000) Bowling 
Alone, chimes well with the focus in these documents on „community‟. As several commentators 
have noted in recent years, the rise of the discourse of „community‟ has served to marginalise 
discussions of „society‟ and actively conceal social-structural inequalities and factors in favour of 
community and individual empowerment (Merli, 2002; Rose, 1996). In such a framework of 
understanding, social inequality is the result of inadequate assimilation into the „community‟. By 
strengthening the collective identity of the community, investing in „culture‟ can strengthen „social 
capital‟, which people can then leverage for further acts of social entrepreneurship. 
 
These policy documents seem to assume that the community is the appropriate level of social 
cohesion and is the social space within which the arts and culture can have the biggest impact. 
Community has, within these discourses, become a calculable „capacity‟ that can be maximised: 
They are indicators of the cultural resource base, the community capacity, and the cultural capital which exist at 
local level and which are not well represented in higher level data and indicators produced by national and 
regional agencies. But this form of capital – cultural, social and human – is the fundamental resource base for 
any sustainable cultural economy and the crucial link between cultural capacity, social cohesion and economic 
development. (LGA, 2003: 11) 
The key point raised in this quote is that, within these discourses, culture enables a form of 
sustainable community which will maximise „cultural capital‟, enabling a local community with 
strong social cohesion (measured by social capital) and augment individual human capital (by 
enhancing creative capabilities, „well-being‟, „confidence‟, reconnecting people to formal training 
and educational opportunities (as part of the government‟s project of „life-long learning‟), as well as 
through the social networks they are able to leverage) and thereby deliver economic value and 
development. In short, human development and community development is here subordinated, 
though the mechanism of culture, to the interests of economic development and capital. 
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Capitalising on Culture: Social Reproduction as Measured Labour? 
Our analysis has shown how policy documents and commentary consistently relate the social 
impacts of culture and the arts to forms of indirect economic benefit. In general these benefits take 
the shape of three specific forms of capital: cultural, human and social. These terms are not, by any 
means, clear cut and often overlap, are used interchangeably, or are left ill-defined and vague. 
Nevertheless, there is a degree of consistency in the articulation of „social impacts‟ as „capital‟. 
Like discourses of social capital more generally, they occlude wider social divisions and structural 
inequalities, seeking to intervene at the individual, community and social level, by building social 
capital through integration and conformity with national culture and political-economic status quo 
(Das, 2006; Merli, 2002; cf. Rose, 1996). On the other hand, there is a consistent emphasis on the 
value of culture and the arts in terms of the benefits to the economy. In this respect we see both a 
denial of wider power relations and, at the same time, an effective subordination of culture, and 
cultural work, to the social reproduction of capitalism, which, in our view, has important 
implications for the conceptualisation of cultural and artistic work as productive labour. 
 
Cultural and Artistic Work: Unproductive or Productive Labour? 
There is a long standing debate in Marxist political economy over the significance of the distinction 
between productive and unproductive labour (Harvie, 2006; Cámara Izquierdo, 2006; Mohun, 
1996) the details of which are beyond the scope of this paper. However, drawing upon recent theory 
influenced by autonomist Marxism, we would like to suggest that this dichotomy is increasingly 
untenable in part, at least, because of changes in the production and circulation of contemporary 
value (Dyer-Witheford, 1999; Harvie, 2006; Arvidsson, 2007; De Angelis, 2007). The basic 
contours of this argument suggest that classical Marxist theory draws a clear line between 
productive and unproductive labour, with the former focussing specifically upon waged labour that 
directly produces commodities and the latter encompassing everything from the labour of 
superintendence and circulation, which do not produce value in themselves, but only secure or 
realise surplus value for the capitalist, to „reproductive labour‟ (Harvie, 2006). Reproductive labour 
is a crucial category in these debates as, in Marx‟s original formulation, the labour involved in 
reproducing the commodity labour-power was not deemed to be productive labour (Harvie, 2006: 
135), an assertion that has been contested by the autonomists (Dyer-Witheford, 1999; Dalla-Costa 
and James, 1973) as well as those concerned with the wider economic relations between work in the 
home and in formal employment (e.g., Oakley, 1974; Glucksmann, 1995; 2005).  
 
With the shift of attention in business in western economies away from the production of material 
commodities and on to the production of consumption and branding, this distinction becomes even 
harder to maintain. When organisations are increasingly capitalising directly on culture, the 
boundaries between productive and unproductive labour, in the classical Marxist sense, dissolve. As 
Arvidsson (2007) has noted in his study of advertising and event management in Denmark, the 
employees of advertising agencies are increasingly cast in the role of events coordinator or 
administrator, whilst the content of their advertising campaigns is produced by the unpaid work of 
those active in the countercultural underground. In his study of the launch of a new VW car, the 
launch event consisted of a series of „underground‟, countercultural parties and artistic productions, 
the content of which had been autonomously determined by those recruited to produce them. As 
these producers were not concerned with economic reward, other than insofar as it enabled them to 
throw a great party, but with prestige within their own scene, these events were not produced for a 
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wage in any conventional sense, and were not oriented toward the production of a simply alienable 
commodity. By retaining control over the form and content of the event, other than the presence of 
VW executives and motoring press reporters, these unpaid producers were doubly „free‟ in the 
sense that Terranova (2004) uses when she refers to „free labour‟: „free‟ to work as they chose on an 
autonomous project, and „free‟ in the sense of being unpaid. Of course, for both of these reasons 
they would count as unproductive labourers under a narrow interpretations of the term „productive‟. 
They neither receive a wage nor produce commodities. Despite this, one can readily argue that they 
produced much of the value of the commodity they were publicising, whether they were 
remunerated for this or not.  
 
The key here is that the „value‟ of most, if not all, commodities today is constituted to a large extent 
by their symbolic value (cf. Baudrillard, 1993; Arvidsson, 2006). Branding has assumed the 
position of the dominant locus of „value added‟ and a key determinant of the value of a specific 
commodity is the logo it bears rather than the cost of materials or labour gone into producing it. As 
Klein‟s (2000) study of sweatshop labour and apparel production found, Nike trainers retailing at 
the top end of the fashion sneaker market are produced in the same factories, by the same workers, 
as no-label, low end trainers. The difference was the symbolic significance of the brand. 
 
What these examples demonstrate is the current significance of „cultural work‟. In each case culture 
is being produced by the work of participants, but not for a wage and not as a simple commodity, as 
would be the case in the traditional models of the cultural industries. This idea of culture as work 
resonates with the autonomist concept of immaterial labour articulated by Lazzarato (1996), who 
splits immaterial labour into two aspects, the informational and the cultural. The informational 
aspect refers to „changes taking place in workers‟ labor processes... where the skills involved in 
direct labor are increasingly skills involving cybernetics and computer control‟ (Lazzarato, 1996: 
133). The second aspect „regards the activity that produces the “cultural content” of the 
commodity... a series of activities that are not normally recognised as “work”… the kinds of 
activities involved in defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer 
norms and, more strategically, public opinion‟ (Lazzarato, 1996: 133). Traditional definitions of 
„work‟, and their restriction to the production of commodities, are further problematised by 
Lazzarato‟s (1996: 142) recognition that this kind of immaterial labour involves both „producers‟ 
and „consumers‟. The contemporary production of content for websites like YouTube, MySpace 
and Facebook would be a good example of this blurring distinction. Whilst most of these sites are 
owned by for-profit companies, whose business model is based on selling advertising space on their 
pages, the actual content is produced by users for no direct financial remuneration. In most cases, 
the reward for participation is the participation itself. As in Arvidsson‟s (2007) study, prestige 
within the networks is the pay off. In other cases, such as the web-board moderators discussed by 
Terranova (2000; 2004), the work of providing a product for AOL was similarly unpaid and 
performed either for status or for the cost of the internet access required to perform the moderation 
(see also Harvie, 2006: 154).  
 
Seen as a form of immaterial labour, participation in culture and the arts blurs boundaries. The 
„productivity‟ of this labour is unclear, as there is no simple commodity being produced, and it is 
not remunerated by a wage. Despite this, we would argue, it is productive. This point partly 
explains the focus on participation in the arts found in many of the studies cited as evidence for the 
beneficial social impacts of the arts. Matarasso (1997: iv) suggests that he focuses on „participation 
because it is to this area of the arts that social benefits are most commonly attributed in policy 
discussion‟, and yet, in reality direct participation accounts for only a small amount of cultural 
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engagement (Merli, 2002; Belfiore, 2006). What participation does highlight is the activity, or 
labour, that goes into cultural engagement. But what is produced by this work? The products of 
such labour can, of course, be commodified. Community arts projects can produce revenues, for 
example through amateur theatrical productions, but this is not usually the case and when these 
projects are calling for public funding, such a narrow economic rationale will not stand up. As we 
have argued above, the pay off for investment in the arts is not in the form of financial capital, but 
rather through a series of indirect economic payoffs in the areas of human, social and cultural 
capital.  
 
The Reproduction of the Social as the Value of Culture 
So, what exactly are these forms of „capital‟ and how are they capitalised? What is the value 
produced by cultural work? Our argument is that the product of cultural work is the reproduction of 
the social itself. Participants, in the roles cast for them by policy documents and impact analyses, 
are exhorted to work upon their selves and invest in their „human capital‟. As the focus on training, 
transferable skills, creativity, innovation and learning all suggest, participants are being encouraged 
do develop the productivity of their labour power, in accordance with hegemonic discourses around 
the knowledge or creative economy, so as to command a higher price for it in the labour market. 
But they are also being encouraged to think of themselves as „human capital‟, not as labour. To see 
themselves reflected in the mirror of capitalism as a production function that needs investment and 
work (through participation in the arts) to realise a surplus value for the owner (the subject him or 
herself, though the real beneficiary is capital itself, as no „benefit‟ can be realised until the labour 
power thereby produced is subsequently deployed). 
 
A similar argument can be made concerning the concept of social capital mobilised in these 
discourses. It has been argued that production is increasingly dependent upon networks of social 
cooperation as evinced by the popularity, across the sectors, of discourses on teamwork, corporate 
culture management and communities of practice (Brown, 1998; Wenger et al., 2003). Of course, 
from the outset, capitalism was dependent upon the collectivisation of labour to increase 
productivity simply through the efficiency gains of natural cooperation (Marx, 1976; Negri, 1989). 
With the division of labour, productivity increases even further, but does so at the cost of natural 
cooperation. The Fordist model of organisation takes this perhaps the furthest, by insisting upon the 
complete subordination of the individual worker to the socio-technical system of the factory but, as 
Dyer-Witheford (1999) notes, this system also created problems by making the bifurcation between 
capital and labour all too obvious. The age of mass-production was also the age of the mass-worker, 
a recalcitrant workforce all too aware of its common fate at the hands of industrial capital.  
 
The balance of power was shifting in the 1960s and 1970s with strong unions, hostile labour 
relations and increasing industrial unrest in many Western countries. In response to this, 
autonomists have argued, capital disaggregated, breaking up the vertically integrated factories of 
the early 20th century in favour of more distributed networks of production with workers 
reorganised in these networks as customers and suppliers, team-workers or subcontractors. This 
also shifted the focus on communication. Under the era of the mass-worker communication was 
prohibited. On Ford‟s production line workers could not talk to one another. With the new systems, 
as Lazzarato (1996) recognises in his first aspect of immaterial labour, communication is essential 
to both organisation and production. Through actively working to produce, reproduce, and innovate 
within these networks of social cooperation, labour itself takes on the principle function of the 
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reproduction of these cooperative networks (Negri, 1989: 51). From this perspective, the age of the 
mass worker has passed over into the age of the social worker, whose main function is the 
reproduction of the social itself, but who is also increasingly subject to control through socialisation 
(Dyer-Witheford, 1999).  
 
Whether this line of argument is empirically accurate, or speaks to the workplace realities of the 
majority of the population even in „advanced‟ western economies is a moot point (cf. Thompson, 
2005). Nevertheless, it seems to us that the argument does point toward a historical tendency. 
Changes in the organisation of the capitalist enterprise have taken place and, at least for certain 
segments of the labour forces, collaboration, communities and teams are increasingly the norm. 
Even if there is a gap between the rhetoric and the reality, managerial discourses on the importance 
of cooperation, eliciting full participation through teamworking or leveraging collective knowledge 
and creativity through communities of practice abound (Newell et al, 2002; Wenger et al, 2003).  
 
At the very least, these ideas have had an impact on the kinds of policy documents on the arts and 
culture that we have been concerned with in this paper. Read from this perspective, the invocation 
of „social capital‟ and community building in policy documents relates both to a new mode of 
government for such populations, one that had moved decisively from mass-society and the Fordist 
compromise of Keynesian economics and a welfare state to ameliorate the working class, to one 
where the class has itself been fragmented and recomposed at the level of the community (Hardt 
and Negri, 1994; Rose, 1996). Within this new framework, however, communities are being 
encouraged to self-govern, in similar ways to workplace teams self-organising. The imperative is 
clear that such communities must contribute to the functioning of the overall whole, so that the 
nation does not disappear, but becomes the focal point of integration for individuals and 
communities (Hyland, 2006). And this contribution has, of course, to be measured and evaluated in 
order to become controllable, manageable and malleable.  
 
Beyond Measure? The Value of Cultural Work Today 
The question of measure has become a hotly debated topic amongst autonomist Marxists in recent 
years (see, for example, Hardt and Negri, 2000, 2004; Caffentzis, 2005; De Angelis, 2005, 2006; 
Harvie, 2006; Dowling, 2007). The source of the controversy is the claim by certain autonomist 
Marxists that today‟s labour is „beyond measure‟ or „immeasurable‟ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 294; 
2004: 145), which is based on the „real subsumption‟ thesis discussed earlier. Hardt and Negri‟s 
argument is that today it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between labour and capital, as 
capital has subsumed labour completely: „capital is the totality of labor and life‟ (Negri, 1991: 122). 
Based on a reading of Marx‟s Grundrisse and the second volume of Capital (Marx, 1973, 1992), 
Hardt and Negri argue that today capital should be seen as „total social capital‟, meaning that the 
social itself has become capital, and capital has become life itself. In other words, work is not only 
that which produces value in the limited realms of the labour process. Instead, work is limitless 
today as it involves a whole range of communicative, immaterial and affective aspects that produce 
the social and life directly (Lazzarato, 1996). It is for this reason that Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) 
argue that labour has become „immeasurable‟.  
 
Following this logic, artistic and cultural work can be seen as the labour that reproduces „total social 
capital‟ in two senses: First, capital is inserted into the interstices of the reproduction of „culture‟ 
itself and culture becomes a commodity. This is the traditional „culture industry‟ thesis, which 
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suggests a continuous commodification and „sell out‟ of culture to capital (Adorno and Horkheimer, 
1979). While this process of commodification is, no doubt, ongoing, the second sense of the „total 
social capital‟ thesis points to the role culture plays in the reproduction of the social and life as 
such. While we agree with the basic contours of this argumentation by autonomist Marxists, we 
share the views of commentators, such as Wittel (2004), Dowling (2007) and De Angelis (2006), 
who doubt the claim that this totality of social capital is automatically „beyond measure‟.  
 
Wittel (2004), for example, states that the post-Fordist economies, however unstable and 
contingent, still work functionally and effectively, for which measure is needed: „So, de facto, the 
affective dimensions of labour are constantly measured. Although this measuring is difficult, it is 
also imperative‟ (2004: 26). This constant need to measure immaterial and affective work, which is 
supposedly „beyond measure‟, is empirically shown by Dowling (2007) in her critical, 
auto-biographical assessment of work in a restaurant. In quite some detail she discusses the 
mechanisms through which she was subjected to forms of control, showing how her work was 
intensely measured and hence its nature altered.  
 
This need for measuring labour and life in the post-Fordist society is also explained by De Angelis, 
for whom „measure‟ is a necessary part of any social body: „A measure is always a discursive 
device that acts as a point of reference, a benchmark, a typical norm, a standard. It is thus a 
relational reference point that guides action of a singular body subject, yet it carries the weight of 
the habits, traditions and cultures of the social body.‟ (De Angelis, 2006: 176, emphasis in original). 
Based on Marx‟s work, De Angelis distinguishes between external and immanent measures of 
value. The external measure is the normal price tag that capital puts onto commodities, such as 
labour. For example, the city worker earns ten times as much as the nurse, which is a way of saying 
that we, as society, value stockbrokers much more than nurses caring for the sick and elderly (f. 
Elson, 1979). De Angelis agrees with Hardt and Negri that we cannot stop there; that is, this 
external measure does not tell us the whole story about how value is produced today. In addition, 
we need to recognise the immanent forms of work today, which reproduce the social and life as 
such. In contrast to Hardt and Negri, however, De Angelis argues that this immanence is very much 
part of a measurement regime as well. For him, the immanent measure of value 
corresponds to that labour which is socially necessary for the production of a commodity. As its corresponding 
external measure, this immanent measure of value is also constituted by the ongoing working of capitalist 
disciplinary processes (and therefore value struggles) passing through markets, as well as their state-implanted 
simulations. … And when we bring this reflection to the foreground, we realize that the disciplinary mechanism 
that creates commodity values is at the same time the disciplinary mechanism that attributes value to the social 
actions that produce those commodities, that creates patterns of how we produce them, what we produce, how 
much of them we produce, how we relate to each other in producing them, what system of needs we create, and 
how we distribute our social doing, our social labour across the social body. (De Angelis, 2006: 180, emphasis 
in original) 
In other words, it is not only the external measure of commodity value that disciplines the worker, 
but also the immanent measures of value, which aim at disciplining all aspects of life of the social 
body. Culture and the arts are subjected to both external and immanent measures of value. 
Externally, it is part of a general commodification process that turns cultural and artistic materials 
into commodities. However, in addition, the immanent role of culture and the arts is to govern and 
discipline the social body in order to guarantee a continuous reproduction of capital. It is this 
important immanent role that makes it necessary for the state to measure and govern the social 
impacts of culture and the arts.  
 
We have argued in this paper that, while the Thatcher regime was mainly concerned with ensuring 
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that culture and the arts are increasingly subjected to the general commodification process of 
capital, New Labour has extended this logic by concentrating its governing efforts on „improving‟ 
the immanent measure of the value of culture and the arts. It is for this discursive shift from 
Conservative to New Labour cultural policies that we think Shorthose and Strange‟s (2004) 
valorisation of the autonomy of cultural and artistic work misses the point. While we clearly see the 
possibility of such autonomy – which correspondents to the second face of Dyer-Witheford‟s 
(2002) „value subjects‟, namely the autonomous subjectivity that is capable of resisting hegemonic 
regimes of value and actively forging new values – Shorthose and Strange (2004) do not take 
sufficient account of those powerful discourses of governance that already point beyond narrow 
economist evaluations of culture and the arts. So, when they claim that “artistic and cultural labour 
… makes a substantial contribution to the general welfare of society and its communities”, and 
when they see “such artistic labour, social reciprocity and trust-based exchange contribute 
substantially to the quality of life of its producers and consumers” (Shorthose and Strange, 2004: 
49), then New Labour is on their side. That is, New Labour would not necessarily disagree with 
Shorthose and Strange‟s autonomist, „art for art‟s sake‟ argument, as our above discussion of Jowell 
(2004) has shown. However, it is precisely because of culture‟s importance for the „general welfare 
of society and its communities‟ that the government sees an increasing need to control and measure 
cultural and artistic work, as our analysis of policy documents has shown. 
 
Conclusions 
The aim of this paper has been to explore the ways in which culture and the arts have been 
articulated in relation to wider society and the economy in recent years. Our analysis of policy 
documents has shown that there has been a discursive shift from the Thatcherite regime of 
governance, which mainly emphasised the need for culture and the arts to become part of the 
commodity market, toward a New Labour discourse that highlights the important role of culture and 
the arts for the general welfare of society. Our analysis has shown that this discursive shift has led 
to a general tendency toward evaluating and measuring culture and the arts in relation to policy 
interests that are external to the immediate concerns of the field of cultural production. While today 
policies that seek to make culture and the arts directly economically productive have not 
disappeared, the discourse represented by New Labour involves more complex articulations of the 
value of culture and the arts for wider social measures such as „well-being‟, „health‟, „education‟, 
„creativity‟, „innovation‟, „social inclusion‟, „human capital‟ and „social capital‟. Our aim was to 
discuss this discursive shift in relation to contemporary conceptions of capitalism. 
 
Our argument has been mainly inspired by autonomist Marxist authors who have argued that today 
capital should be understood as „total social capital‟, i.e. capital that has completely subsumed the 
social. While writers such as Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) argue that this totality implies that 
contemporary work and labour are „beyond measure‟, our analysis of cultural policy discourse has 
shown that measurement and evaluation is still very much part of the way the capital-state regime 
reproduces itself. Following De Angelis (2006), we have argued that capital as well as the state 
have an instrumental interest in applying both „external‟ and „immanent‟ measures of value to 
culture and the arts in order to, first, capitalise on the cultural industries for continuous economic 
growth, and, second, use culture and the arts as instruments for the social reproduction of labour. 
We have argued that in both of these ways cultural and artistic labour needs to be understood as 
productive labour. 
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.............................. 
incorporate following into the conclusions and directions for further research? Idea would be to 
suggest that focusing on producers, rather than the full circuit of production, valorises a specific 
conception of creativity that will tend to recapture it as 'skillful' or 'knowledgeable' or even 
'creative' labour... 
An interesting, and slightly confusing, argument is presented on p.145 where Hesmondalgh notes 
the widening remit of the „creative industries‟, which include areas like software development (and 
much more when we come to Florida and Howkins a page later). This conjunction enables the 
„moral prestige‟ of the creative artist to be mobilised in defence of IPR for industry. More 
importantly, I think, is the notion that this also pushed a model of transferable skills whereby 
creativity could move between the arts, culture and ICT. This in turn directly influenced education 
policy toward a more „skills‟ oriented approach and, according to Hesmondalgh, pushed the focus 
onto the artist rather than the audience and infrastructure. This is probably so, except that where 
the audience is discussed, through participation in cultural events etc, they are themselves seen as 
enhancing their creativity and skills. Consumption can no longer be passive, but must be active: it 
must become work that will increase the value of the participant‟s labour power (through skills 
development or just by enhancing their ambition, „aspiration‟ and motivation. After all, as David 
Harvie (2006) has noted directly, and Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) imply with their analysis of 
the crisis of capitalist social reproduction in the 1960s, labour power needs both practical skills and 
motivation to effectively valorise capital.  
 
 
 
 
References 
Adorno, T.W. and Horkheimer, M. (1979) Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. J. Cumming. London: 
Verso. 
Anderson, B. (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Spread of Nationalism. London: 
Verso. 
Arthur, C.J. (2004) „Value and negativity: a reply to Carchedi‟, Capital & Class, 82: 17-22. 
Arts Council of England, The National Museum Directors‟ Conference, The Museums, Libraries 
and Archives Council, The Association of INdependent Museums, The Group for Large Local 
Authority Museums, The Museums Association, The University Museums Group (2006) 
Values and Vision: The Contribution of Culture. Available on-line at: 
http://www.nationalmuseums.org.uk/images/publications/values_and_vision_no_pics.pdf 
Arvidsson, A. (2006) Brands: Meaning and Value in Media Culture. London: Routledge. 
Arvidsson, A. (2007) „Creative Class or Administrative Class? On Advertising and the 
„Underground‟‟, ephemera: theory & politics in organization, 7(1): 8-23, 
http://www.ephemeraweb.org/journal/7-1/7-1arvidsson.pdf 
Baudrillard, J. (1993) Symbolic Exchange and Death. London: Sage. 
Belfiore, E. (2004) „Auditing culture‟, International Journal of Cultural Policy, 10(2): 183-202. 
Belfiore, E. (2006) „The social impacts of the arts – myth or reality?‟, in Mizra, M. (ed.) Culture 
Vultures: Is UK Arts Policy Damaging the Arts? London: Policy Exchange. 
Belfiore, E. (2007) „A Matter of Values‟, Arts Professional, 140 (26 February): 8-9. 
Belfiore, E. and Bennett, O. (2007) 'Rethinking the Social Impact of the Arts', International Journal 
  
 19 
 
 
of Cultural Policy, 13(2): 135-151. 
Benjamin, W. (2002) „The Author as Producer‟, in S. Dunscombe (ed.) Cultural Resistance Reader. 
London: Verso. 
Blair, T. (2007) „Cultural speech at Tate Modern‟, 6 March 2007, 
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page11166.asp 
Boltanski, L. and Chiapello, E. (2005) The New Spirit of Capitalism. London: Verso. 
Bourdieu, P. (1984) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London: Routledge. 
Bourdieu, P. (1993) The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Bowring, F. (2004) „From the mass worker to the multitude: A theoretical contextualisation of 
Hardt and Negri‟s Empire‟, Capital & Class, 83: 101-132. 
Brown, A. (1998) Organizational Culture. London: Financial Times Pitman Publishing. 
Caffentzis, G. (2005) „Immeasurable Value? An Essay on Marx‟s Legacy‟, The Commoner, 10: 
87-114. 
Cámara Izquierdo, S. (2006) „A value-oriented distinction between productive and unproductive 
labour‟, Capital & Class, 90: 37-63. 
Capital & Class (2004) Special issue on the Creative Industries, 84. 
Carchedi, G. (2003) „A note on Chris Arthur‟s “dialectics of negativity”‟, Capital & Class, 81: 
25-30. 
Dalla Costa, M. and James, S. (1973) The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community. 
Berlin: Falling Wall Press. 
Das, R.J. (2006) „Putting social capital in its place‟, Capital & Class, 90: 65-92. 
Davenport, T. and Prusak, L. () Working Knowledge: How Organizations Manage What they Know. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Dawson, P. (1994) Organizational Change: A Processual Approach, London: Paul Chapman. 
DCMS (2006) „Creative Industries Economic Estimates Statistical Bulletin‟, September, 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/Reference_library/Research/statistics_outputs/creative_industries_
eco_est.htm.  
DCMS (2007) Culture and Creativity in 2007. London: DCMS. Available at: 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/8B79CCFD-7EF9-4F51-80CC-531134C79575/0/Cu
ltureandCreativity2.pdf 
De Angelis, M. (2005) „Value(s), Measure(s) and Disciplinary Markets‟, The Commoner, 10: 
65-86. 
De Angelis, M. (2006) The Beginning of History: Value Struggles and Global Capital. London: 
Pluto. 
Dowling, E. (2007) „Producing the Dining Experience: Measure, Subjectivity and the Affective 
Worker‟, ephemera: theory & politics in organization, 7(1): 117-132. 
Drucker, P. (1968) The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to our Changing Society. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Dyer-Witheford, N. (1999) Cyber-Marx. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Dyer-Witheford, N. (2002) „Global Body, Global Brain/ Global Factory, Global War: Revolt of the 
Value-Subjects‟, The Commoner, January, N.3: 1-30, 
http://www.commoner.org.uk/03dyer-witheford.pdf.  
Eagleton, T. (2000) The Idea of Culture. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Edwards, R. (1997) Changing Places? Flexibility, Lifelong Learning and a Learning Society. 
London: Routledge. 
Fairclough, N. (1995) Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Longman. 
firstsite (2007) firstsite:newsite - newsletter 1. Colchester: firstsite. 
  
 20 
 
 
Fleming, P. (2005) „Workers‟ playtime? Boundaries and cynicism in a “culture of fun” program‟, 
The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 41(3): 285-303. 
Florida, R. (2002) The Rise of the Creative Class. New York: Basic Books.  
Florida, R. (2004) Cities and the Creative Class. London: Routledge. 
Glucksmann, M. (1995) Why „Work‟? Gender and the „Total Social Organization of Labour‟  
Gender, Work & Organization, 2(2): 63–75.  
Glucksmann, M. (2005) „Shifting boundaries and interconnections: Extending the 'total social 
organisation of labour'‟, The Sociological Review,  53(s2): 19–36.  
Grey, C. (2002) „Local government and the arts‟, Local Government Studies, 28(1): 77-90. 
Grover, C. (2003) „“New Labour”, welfare reform and the reserve army of labour‟, Capital & 
Class, 79: 17-23. 
Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (1994) The Labor of Dionysus. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2000) Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2004) Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. London: 
Penguin. 
Harris, M. (2006) „Technology, innovation and post-bureaucracy‟: the case of the British Library, 
Journal of Organisational Change Management, 19(1): 80-93. 
Harvie, D. (2006) „Value production and struggle in the classroom: Teachers within, against and 
beyond capital‟, Capital & Class, 88: 1-32. 
Hesmondhalgh, D. The Cultural Industries, 2nd Edition. London: Sage. 
Holden, J. (2004) Capturing Cultural Value: How Culture has Become a Tool of Government 
Policy. London: Demos. 
House of Commons (2002) First Report - DCMS - National Museums and Galleries: Funding and 
Free Admission. London: HMSO. 
Hyland, M. (2006) „Proud Scum: The Spectre of the Ingrate‟, Mute 2(2): 19-25. 
Jacques, R. (2000) „Theorizing knowledge as work: The need for a „knowledge theory of value‟, in 
C. Pritchard, R. Hull, M. Chumer and H. Willmott (eds.) Managing Knowledge: Critical 
Investigations of Work and Learning. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Jowell, T. (2004) Government and the Value of Culture. London: HMSO/DCMS. 
Kelly, O., Wojdat, E., and Khan, N.(1997) The Creative Bits, The Social Impacts of the Arts Using 
Digital Technology. Stroud: Comedia. 
Kennedy, P. (2005) „Social policy, social exclusion and commodity fetishism‟, Capital & Class, 85: 
91-114. 
Kicillof, A. and Starosta, G. (2007) „Value form and class struggle: A critique of the autonomist 
theory of value‟, Capital & Class, 92: 13-40. 
Klein, N. (2000) No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies. London: Flamingo. 
Lazzarato, M. (1996) „Immaterial Labour‟, in P. Virno and M. Hardt (eds.) Radical Thought in 
Italy: A Potential Politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Leadbeater, C. (1999) Living on Thin Air: The New Economy. London: Viking. 
Local Government Association (LGA) (2003) Creative Consequences: The contribution and impact 
of the arts in Essex: 2001/02. London: LGA Publications. 
Marx, K. (1973) Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. M. Nicolaus. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Marx, K. (1976) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, trans. B. Fowkes. London: 
Penguin. 
Marx, K. (1992) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 2, trans. D. Fernbach. London: 
Penguin. 
  
 21 
 
 
Matarasso, F. (1997) Use or Ornament?: The Social Impact of Participation in the Arts. Stroud: 
Comedia. 
Merli, P. (2002) „Evaluating the social impact of participation in arts activities: A critical review of 
Francois Matarasso‟s Use or Ornament‟, International Journal of Cultural Policy, 8,1: 
107-118  
Mizra, M. (ed.) (2006) Culture Vultures: Is UK Arts Policy Damaging the Arts? London: Policy 
Exchange. 
Mohun, S. (1996) „Productive and Unproductive Labor in the Labor Theory of Value‟, Review of 
Radical Political Economics, 28(4): 30-54.  
Negri, A. (1989) The Politics of Subversion: A Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Negri, A. (1991) Marx beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse. New York: Autonomedia. 
Negri, A. (1999) 'Value and Affect', Boundary 2, 26(2): 77-88. 
Newell, S., Robertson, M., Scarbrough, H. and Swan, J. (2003) Managing Knowledge Work. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Oakley, A. (1974) The Sociology of Housework. New York: Pantheon. 
Paltridge, B. (2006) Discourse Analysis. London: Continuum.  
Putnam, R. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Revival and Collapse of American Community. New York: 
Simon and Schuster.  
Rose, N. (1996) „The death of the social? Re-figuring the territory of government‟, Economy and 
Society, 25(3): 327 - 356 
Ross, A. (2000) „The mental labor problem‟, Social Text, 19(2): 1-31. 
Said, E. (1993) Culture and Imperialism. London: Vintage. 
Shorthose, J. (2004) „The engineered and the vernacular in cultural quarter development‟, Capital 
& Class, 84: 159-178. 
Shorthose, J. and Strange, G. (2004) „The new cultural economy, the artist and the social 
configuration of autonomy‟, Capital & Class, 84: 43-59.   
Tapscott, D. (1996) The Digital Economy. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Terranova, T. (2000) „Free Labor: Producing Culture for the Digital Economy‟, Social Text, 18(2): 
33-58. 
Terranova, T. (2004) Network Culture: Politics for the Information Age. London: Pluto. 
Thompson, P. (2005) „Foundation and Empire: A critique of Hardt and Negri‟, Capital & Class, 86: 
73-100. 
Wenger, E., McDermott, R. and Snyder, W. (2003) Cultivating Communities of Practice. 
Cambridge MA: Harvard Business School Press.  
Wittel, A. (2004) „Culture, labour and subjectivity: For a political economy from below‟, Capital & 
Class, 84: 11-30. 
Work Foundation, The (2007) „Report hails economic vitality of Britain‟s creative industries‟, Press 
Release, 25 June 2007, http://www.theworkfoundation.com/aboutus/media/pressreleases/ 
britainscreativeindustries.aspx 
Work Foundation, The / DCMS (2007) „Staying ahead: the economic performance of the UK‟s 
creative industries‟, Report, 25 June 2007, http://www.cep.culture.gov.uk/ 
index.cfm?fuseaction=main.viewBlogEntry&intMTEntryID=3095 
Wright, S. (2005) „Reality check: Are we living in an immaterial world?‟, Mute, 2(1): 34-45. 
On-line at: http://www.metamute.org/en/node/5594 
 
 
 
  
 22 
 
 
 
